Hey everyone!
Here are our meeting logs:
http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2024/tor-meeting.2024-01-25-15.58.html
And our meeting pad:
Anti-censorship work meeting pad
···
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Anti-censorship
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Next meeting: Thursday, February 116:00 UTC
Facilitator: shelikhoo
Weekly meetings, every Thursday at 16:00 UTC, in #tor-meeting at OFTC
(channel is logged while meetings are in progress)
This week's Facilitator: onyinyang
== Goal of this meeting ==
Weekly check-in about the status of anti-censorship work at Tor.
Coordinate collaboration between people/teams on anti-censorship at the Tor Project and Tor community.
== Links to Useful documents ==
* Our anti-censorship roadmap:
* Roadmap:Development · Boards · Anti-censorship · GitLab
* The anti-censorship team's wiki page:
* Home · Wiki · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / Team · GitLab
* Past meeting notes can be found at:
* Tickets that need reviews: from sponsors, we are working on:
* All needs review tickets:
* Merge requests · Anti-censorship · GitLab
<Merge requests · Anti-censorship · GitLab;
* Sponsor 96 <-- meskio, shell, onyinyang, cohosh
* Sponsor 150 <-- meskio working on it
* Issues · Anti-censorship · GitLab
== Announcements ==
*
== Discussion ==
* SQS rendezvous deployment
* follow up from last week: cohosh will try to deploy later today
* Issues · net4people/bbs · GitHub Snowflake
bridges in Tor browser 13.0.8 stopped working properly in China
since around 2024-01-12"
* dcf hasn't had a chance to look at the logs yet
* no big change in aggregate statistics
https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/metrics-country.html?start=2023-11-01&end=2024-01-25&country=cn
<All Tor Metrics graphs for a country on one page;
* BridgeStatus also shows many 10% results for snowflake bootstrap
attempts in China
* 2023-12-10
recentResult_cnnext · 1b857f0389539e38974c76a68e633d127c7fd188 · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / Connectivity Measurement / BridgeStatus · GitLab
rate of bootstrap percent, some 100
* Tor 中文指南: "#Snowflake 是 Tor 浏览器的内置网桥之一，它使用户的网络流量看上去像视频通话一样。 …" - Mastodon
* from packet capture from vantage point, appears that there is a full
block of proxy (one way stun) and block of server hello packet (keep
receiving client hello)
== Actions ==
== Interesting links ==
== Reading group ==
* We will discuss "" on
*
* Questions to ask and goals to have:
* What aspects of the paper are questionable?
* Are there immediate actions we can take based on this work?
* Are there long-term actions we can take based on this work?
* Is there future work that we want to call out in hopes that others
will pick it up?
== Updates ==
Name:
* This week:
* - What you worked on this week.
* Next week:
* - What you are planning to work on next week.
* Help with:
* - Something you need help with.
cecylia (cohosh): 2024-01-25
* Last week:
* - merged SQS rendezvous feature
* - talked to browser team about lyrebird issue
* - worked on Lox module for Tor Browser
* This week:
* - finish Lox module implementation
* - update wasm-bindgen fork to fix some bugs and hopefully upstream
changes
* - tor-browser-build updates for lox wasm + bindings generation
* - deploy SQS rendezvous changes at broker
* - rebase and try out manifest v3 patch
* - Conjure bridge maintenance
* Needs help with:
dcf: 2024-01-25
* Last week:
* -adjusted parity of upper port range on snowflake-02
snowflake-01: Change upper value for local port range (#40299) · Issues · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / Pluggable Transports / Snowflake · GitLab
* - answered a question about distribution of users over snowflake
bridges
[anti-censorship-team] Snowflake bridge operations
* - hacked a little bit on ALPN-01 ACME challenge in snowflake server
Let broker/bridge/probetest acme/autocert use ALPN-01 challenge (#40320) · Issues · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / Pluggable Transports / Snowflake · GitLab
* Next week:
* - review draft MR for unreliable data channels
Draft: Unreliable+unordered WebRTC data channel transport for Snowflake (!219) · Merge requests · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / Pluggable Transports / Snowflake · GitLab
* - open issue to have snowflake-client log whenever KCPInErrors is
nonzero
Deploy snowflake-server for QueuePacketConn buffer reuse fix (#40260) (#40262) · Issues · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / Pluggable Transports / Snowflake · GitLab
* - open issue to disable /debug endpoint on snowflake broker
* - move snowflake-02 to new VM
Help with:
meskio: 2023-12-21
Last week:
- grant writing
Next week:
Shelikhoo: 2024-01-25
Last Week:
* - HTTPS distributors in rdsys:
Implement HTTPS distributor with comparable feature set to bridgedb implementation (#191) · Issues · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / rdsys · GitLab
* - update container image for snowflake-proxy and obfs4-proxy(Image
is published already, while merge request under review:
Sign in · GitLab)
* - Merge request reviews
Next Week/TODO:
* - HTTPS distributors in rdsys:
Implement HTTPS distributor with comparable feature set to bridgedb implementation (#191) · Issues · The Tor Project / Anti-censorship / rdsys · GitLab
* - Inspect Snowflake Situation In China
onyinyang: 2023-01-25
* Last week(s):
* - Bug fixing and other things that come up as lox integration is
rolled out
* - document API for lox client/server requests
* - get next unlock function
*
* This week:
* - Bug fixing and other things that come up as lox integration is
rolled out
* - Figure out problem that makes distributor hang when bridges are
not working
* -Make Lox invitation endpoint only accessible via telegram
* - attempt hyper upgrade again
*
* (long term things were discussed at the meeting!):
Riseup Pad
* - brainstorming grouping strategies for Lox buckets (of bridges) and
gathering context on how types of bridges are distributed/use in
practice
* Question: What makes a bridge usable for a given user, and how can
we encode that to best ensure we're getting the most appropriate
resources to people?
* 1. Are there some obvious grouping strategies that we can already
consider?
* e.g., by PT, by bandwidth (lower bandwidth bridges sacrificed to
open-invitation buckets?), by locale (to be matched with a
requesting user's geoip or something?)
* 2. Does it make sense to group 3 bridges/bucket, so trusted users
have access to 3 bridges (and untrusted users have access to 1)?
More? Less?
*
theodorsm: 2023-01-11
* Last weeks:
* - Currently in the start phase of writing my master thesis (to be
finished late june 2024) in communication technology on reducing
distinguishability of DTLS. The goal is to implement a validated
DTLS anti-fingerprinting library similar to uTLS (useful for Snowflake).
* Next weeks:
* - Talk with Sean DuBois about contributing to adding
anti-fingerprinting capabilities to the pion library
* Help with:
* - Find recent data set of captured DTLS traffic
--
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onyinyang
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