# Websites blocking Tor

**URL:** https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095
**Category:** Tor Browser Desktop
**Created:** [December 31, 2022, 5:47am UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095 "2022-12-31T05:47:07Z")
**Posts on this page:** 13
**Page:** 1

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### Author: ![Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/aeb1de/32.png) [@Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/u/Torrifictill1000)
#### Post date: [December 31, 2022, 5:47am UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/1 "2022-12-31T05:47:07Z")

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Would it be possible to add some type of “bridge” as last hop?

Many websites seems to be able to recognize TOR exits and, subsequently, block the connection.

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### Author: ![OnionHead](https://forum.torproject.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/o/0ea827/32.png) [@OnionHead](https://forum.torproject.org/u/OnionHead)
#### Post date: [January 1, 2023, 5:48am UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/2 "2023-01-01T05:48:45Z")

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If you just need to view the website you can use [Wayback Machine](https://web.archive.org/) or [Archive.today](https://archive.is) [[Onion](http://archiveiya74codqgiixo33q62qlrqtkgmcitqx5u2oeqnmn5bpcbiyd.onion/)].  
Beside that, some [SearXNG & SearX](https://searx.space) instances include MortyProxy, for example [[https://searx.fmac.xyz](https://searx.fmac.xyz)]'s MortyProxy is [[https://searx.fmac.xyz/morty/](https://searx.fmac.xyz/morty/)].

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### Author: ![WofWca](https://forum.torproject.org/user_avatar/forum.torproject.org/wofwca/32/2302_2.png) [@WofWca](https://forum.torproject.org/u/WofWca)
#### Post date: [January 1, 2023, 1:57pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/3 "2023-01-01T13:57:36Z")

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Interesting idea.

I think it it’s either possible right now, or very close to it. You can already configure what relays Tor chooses by editing the `torrc` file of your client. For the exit relay I believe there is an option to make the relay not announce itself.

However, I think that non-public exit relays are much less private because only those who know about it can use it.  
If you don’t care about anonymity too much, you can consider a VPN instead (at least for such websites).

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### Author: ![Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/aeb1de/32.png) [@Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/u/Torrifictill1000)
#### Post date: [January 2, 2023, 1:31pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/4 "2023-01-02T13:31:48Z")

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Ok, thanks for suggestions.

Unfortunately, the TOR blocking websites are often also able to block VPN exits.  
And, unless You pay with crypto currency/cash money, You leave a money trail.  
(Duckduckgo might offer some privacy).

But it would be nice if TOR could circumvent this type of censorship.

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### Author: ![everydayisok](https://forum.torproject.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/e/bbce88/32.png) [@everydayisok](https://forum.torproject.org/u/everydayisok)
#### Post date: [January 4, 2023, 9:49am UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/5 "2023-01-04T09:49:54Z")

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Many websites can easily block Tor because the IP of the exit node is disclosed. The real form of unpublished exit nodes is: exit+non-tor nodes, since non-tor nodes are not disclosed, websites cannot block such exit nodes. This form of exit node is very easy to implement, it requires two different IP addresses, Exit (IP1) → non-tor node (IP2) → website.

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### Author: ![Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/aeb1de/32.png) [@Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/u/Torrifictill1000)
#### Post date: [January 4, 2023, 11:50am UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/6 "2023-01-04T11:50:51Z")

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Interesting, is it implemented already - i.e. can a user of TOR Browser choose this type of exit node as of now?

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### Author: ![everydayisok](https://forum.torproject.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/e/bbce88/32.png) [@everydayisok](https://forum.torproject.org/u/everydayisok)
#### Post date: [January 4, 2023, 9:43pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/7 "2023-01-04T21:43:25Z")

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Currently, I don’t find an option for this purpose in Tor Browser. A very poor alternative is that we manually write this type of exit nodes into the browser’s torrc file (ExitNodes fingerprint1, fingerprint2)

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### Author: ![WofWca](https://forum.torproject.org/user_avatar/forum.torproject.org/wofwca/32/2302_2.png) [@WofWca](https://forum.torproject.org/u/WofWca)
#### Post date: [January 4, 2023, 9:43pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/8 "2023-01-04T21:43:34Z")

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I think what @everydayisok suggests is something like a VPN / SOCKS proxy that you connect to through Tor.

Although I don’t think that is easy to set up the stock Tor Browser to work like this, you’d need to use a different browser, and set up the VPN and the Tor client.

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### Author: ![Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/aeb1de/32.png) [@Torrifictill1000](https://forum.torproject.org/u/Torrifictill1000)
#### Post date: [January 5, 2023, 2:38am UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/9 "2023-01-05T02:38:07Z")

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Ok, thank You all for Your input.

As an average user, I would not mess with the TOR Browser - it could easily breach anonymity and/or privacy.

I guess we have to wait, for the TOR developers to come up with some smart solution.

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### Author: ![MadGhigno](https://forum.torproject.org/user_avatar/forum.torproject.org/madghigno/32/2450_2.png) [@MadGhigno](https://forum.torproject.org/u/MadGhigno)
#### Post date: [January 27, 2023, 11:27pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/10 "2023-01-27T23:27:35Z")

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What is the purpose of publishing all the exit nodes ip addresses ? In this way anyone can block navigation of tor user very easily

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### Author: ![WofWca](https://forum.torproject.org/user_avatar/forum.torproject.org/wofwca/32/2302_2.png) [@WofWca](https://forum.torproject.org/u/WofWca)
#### Post date: [January 28, 2023, 12:30pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/11 "2023-01-28T12:30:14Z")

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Not publishing a node makes it inaccessible for Tor users.

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### Author: ![red0bear](https://forum.torproject.org/user_avatar/forum.torproject.org/red0bear/32/1976_2.png) [@red0bear](https://forum.torproject.org/u/red0bear)
#### Post date: [January 28, 2023, 5:17pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/12 "2023-01-28T17:17:51Z")

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they can do that cause we have website tor page who shows all types relays info.

look here → [metrics.torproject.org](http://metrics.torproject.org)

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### Author: ![red0bear](https://forum.torproject.org/user_avatar/forum.torproject.org/red0bear/32/1976_2.png) [@red0bear](https://forum.torproject.org/u/red0bear)
#### Post date: [January 28, 2023, 5:17pm UTC](https://forum.torproject.org/t/websites-blocking-tor/6095/13 "2023-01-28T17:17:52Z")

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many websites can block outside ips cause they can think you trying attack. Even with real ips this can happen.
