Background:
At the time, our AS was generating ~25% of the exit traffic. I then configured
one server with 40 exit relays and another with 40 guard relays.
We are now only generating ~16%.
It’s actually a real shame that the abuse-resistant IPs¹ don't handle exit
traffic. In addition, my exit policy is very open.
reject *:25
accept *:*
I don't fully grasp the voodoo behind consensus weight and circuit selection,
but the fact that all the relays are in the same /16 subnet plays a role.
I believe that adding more Tor exit instances to our AS won't increase our CW
or traffic volume.
And when I see the current attacks against (Hidden)Onion-Services that are
forcing some guards to their knees, stable guards are also needed.
With the planned 2-week C-tor release cycle, HSDir's are in for some really
tough times.
Background: Why niftybunny split up his AS and servers back then
I know that it would be much better if exits were more distributed, but
exit bandwidth is much more limited than entry/middle node bandwidth.
There's plenty of bandwidth available¹
Advertised and consumed bandwidth of relay:
¹Especially in our rack or AS. Multiple machines with 2x10G or 2x25G that do
the 'R' in tor.
net.ipv4.conf.default.forwarding=1 # be a router and fwd v4 packets
net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding=1 # be a router and fwd v4 packets
net.ipv6.conf.default.forwarding=1 # be a router and fwd v6 packets
net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1 # be a router and fwd v6 packets
···
On Wednesday, 16 September 2026 17:58:52 CEST Marco Moock via tor-relays wrote: