Hello.
A discussion with a hosting provider led to them making a suggestion
after I showed them ExoneraTor – Tor Metrics, so
I thought I'd explain his suggestion and post it here.
Nowadays, a huge number of hosts are familiar with Tor and sympathize,
but do not allow exits because it severely taints their IPs and makes
them difficult to resell afterwards. With the rising costs of IPv4, it
is a deal-breaker even if the host would otherwise be fine with exits.
Obviously, convincing IP reputation services and blacklists to make an
exception for Tor is impossible: It goes against their mission. But has
anyone tried advocating to these reputation services that they remove
exit IPs from blacklists once they are no longer exiting traffic? This
would reduce the number of false positives in their database without
increasing that of false negatives (which is all they care about).
I imagine hosts would be much more amenable to hosting exits if the
subsequently blacklisted IPs revert to being clean as soon as the exit
operator leaves. After all, "if I'm your customer, the IP ranges I use
will be tainted for a long time and potentially unsellable even after I
leave" is not going to inspire as much confidence as "if I'm your
customer, the IP ranges will only be dirty while I use them".
Is there anything to this? Large exit operators can just register their
own ASN and simply not care about blacklists, but most operators are
not going to be able to do this, especially if they run just a couple
relays anonymously and on a tight budget.
Regards,
forest
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