I don’t believe in mundane. What is happening is an example of “wrong side of the tracks” digital redlining or prejudical profiling and discriminatory geofensing.
A cell site simulator is impersonating the legitimate cell tower and capturing the traffic. When tor is used over LTE, the connection remains encrypted but initializing metadata can be gathered. If the connection is to the legitimate ISP tower, why wouldn’t the ISP perform the same kind of disruptions on other towers in different geographical areas? I suppose someone could gain unauthorized access to a tower and launch attacks.
What I was wondering is if tor could be impersonated like a imposter/clone access point. If a handshake is sent out, for example, could someone with control over the access point pretend to be the tor network?
What they did first was sever VPN connections but continue the internet connection. Then I activated a kill switch so they would sever the VPN and then the internet connection would also be disconnected. Then I started using tor which they can’t sever like a VPN. But then they would just disconnect the internet connection. I can’t see why an ISP would do this, so I thought, well, maybe the cellular access point is being impersonated like wifi can be faked. Then I started wondering, if we can’t trust the medium of the connection, if wifi AP and cellular AP can be faked–and why not fake hardline also, redirected and rerouted by insider threats–then the connections built with encryption have to remain agnostic and independent of the source of the bandwidth. If the state and structure of the medium or infrastructure is controlled, how does the information propagated by that medium maintain its integrity, determine itself? You just have to hope that an adversary that can influence the medium/infrastructure is weaker than the cypher who is sending the message?